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Trouble ahead, trouble behind: 
perceptions of social mobility and 
economic inequality in Mount Frere, 







This paper investigates young black South Africans’ perceptions of social 
mobility and economic inequality, using targeted ethnographic interviews in two 
non-major metropolitan areas of South Africa, and compares these with 
previous research in metropolitan Cape Town. The two areas studied were the 
rural communities around Mount Frere (in the Eastern Cape) and the medium-
sized town of Newcastle (in KwaZulu-Natal). Interviewees in Newcastle had 
similar conceptualisations of the distribution of income in South Africa to those 
in Cape Town, while interviewees in Mount Frere differed. The latter seemed to 
base their perceptions on their experiences outside of Mount Frere and were 
much less focused on the continued association of race and class than those 
from Cape Town and Newcastle. Respondents in Mount Frere and Newcastle 
agreed with the Cape Town interviewees about the importance of education for 
getting ahead, but they also stressed the necessity of political connections and 
highlighted the danger of drugs and alcohol for their mobility prospects. The 
interviews in Mount Frere and Newcastle additionally suggest the troubling 





In a previous working paper, I examined perceptions of social mobility and 
economic inequality among black South Africans in the city of Cape Town 
(Telzak, 2012). Although Cape Town provides an important opportunity for 
studying social mobility in South Africa, Cape Town has a number of distinctive 
economic and demographic characteristics that may limit its relevance to the 
study of mobility in South Africa more generally. Whereas the majority of Cape 
Town residents are white or coloured and advantaged economically relative to 
most South Africans, the majority of South Africans are black and live in more 
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economically tenuous conditions. The findings reported in Telzak (2012) may 
therefore have limited relevance to the rest of South Africa. 
 
In July of 2012, I conducted a series of interviews in the rural areas surrounding 
Mount Frere (in the Eastern Cape) and in the mid-sized town of Newcastle (in 
KwaZulu-Natal) in order to begin to probe perceptions of mobility elsewhere in 
South Africa and to see whether these perceptions do in fact differ from those 
articulated by black individuals in Cape Town. 
 
More than one-third (38 percent) of South Africa’s population lives in what the 
South African government defines as rural areas (World Bank, 2012). These 
rural areas were intentionally underdeveloped during the early and mid-
apartheid periods in order to provide a source of cheap labour for white-owned 
capital. Additionally, during this time, large numbers of poor black individuals 
were removed forcibly out of ‘white’ South African towns and farms into these 
areas. Now, two decades after South Africa’s democratic transition, the rural 
population continues to lag behind the rest of South Africa in a number of key 
infrastructural and human-developmental indicators (du Toit et al., 2007: 525). 
 
The rural population surrounding Mount Frere—located in the former, primarily 
Xhosa homeland (or ‘Bantustan’) of Transkei—is among the starkest examples 
of this underdevelopment. Over 45 percent of those who lived in the greater 
Alfred Nzo District Municipality—the regional administrative body that 
includes the rural areas around Mount Frere—were illiterate in 2001 and 
unemployment reached nearly 68 percent of the population (Development Bank 
of Southern Africa, 2005: 158; 164). 
 
This underdevelopment has led to widespread poverty and malnutrition. In 2002 
a survey of 733 households in the communities around Mount Frere was 
conducted by the Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) at the 
University of the Western Cape. The survey found that 96 percent of households 
lived on less than R560 (about US$70) per month, the upper bound poverty line 
(du Toit, 2005: 9), compared to roughly 66 percent of those living in the Eastern 
Cape as a whole and 79 percent of those living in ‘traditional areas’ in South 
Africa (Statistics South Africa, 2012a: 11 and 13). Although many in Mount 
Frere have access to farmland—the PLAAS survey found that 87 percent of 
households in Mount Frere had access to cultivated land—the 
underdevelopment of rural areas ultimately limits the productivity of this land 
and individuals are thus only able to satisfy a fraction of their nutritional needs 
through farming. As a result, 83 percent of households surveyed by PLAAS 
reported not having enough to eat at some point during the previous year (du 
Toit, 2005: 10-11), and Mount Frere suffers from among the highest rates of 
child malnutrition in the Eastern Cape (Samson, 2002: 1158). Because of the 
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lack of economic opportunity and high rates of poverty in the rural Transkei, 
households often rely on remittances from relatives who have migrated to South 
Africa’s urban or industrial centres and on generous, non-contributory old age 
pensions provided by the state (du Toit et al., 2007; Ardington et al., 2007: 1). 
 
This underdevelopment unsurprisingly influences mobility prospects in rural 
South Africa. Because those in rural areas have limited access to human capital, 
financial assets, and infrastructure, there are few opportunities for economic 
mobility (Carter and May, 1999). The few opportunities that do exist in rural 
areas are generally concentrated in the public sector and captured by those with 
tertiary degrees (van der Berg et al., 2002: 7 and 15). With little hope of 
economic advancement, many rural residents choose to migrate to urban areas in 
search of work. 
 
There are, however, two major barriers to migration from rural to urban areas: 
the first is financial and the second is social. Many rural residents lack the 
financial means necessary to migrate to urban areas in search of work. In fact, 
there is strong evidence of a large uptick in labour-market migration among 
prime-age individuals after their households begin to receive South Africa’s 
incredibly generous Old Age Pension (at more than 820 Rand per month in 
2007, the Old Age Pension paid more than double the median per capita income 
of black Africans) (Ardington et al., 2007; Posel et al., 2006). 
 
Meeting the financial constraints of migration, however, is not sufficient; job 
opportunities in urban areas are often reserved for those who have the requisite 
social capital. Thus, migration decisions, and successful relocation to urban 
areas, often depend more on access to existing migrant networks than on merit 
(see e.g., Baber, 1998: 216). As Seekings and Nattrass (2006: 284) conclude 
after their review of the limited literature available on rural-to-urban migration, 
‘The unemployed people who remain in rural areas … where there are few job 
opportunities [a group that Seekings and Nattrass label the ‘underclass’] are 
probably those who lack the social capital to escape the constraints of local 
conditions’ (Sharp and Spiegel, 1985; Murray, 1995; Nattrass, 2000; Klasen and 
Woolard, 2001). 
 
Even if individuals are able to surmount these high barriers to migration, their 
opportunities for employment remain relatively low. Van der Berg et al. (2002: 
17-32), who develop a model of the relative employment probabilities for black 
Africans from rural and urban areas, conclude that 
 
Most rural labour market participants would not be close to the front 
of the job queue in South Africa’s urban labour markets. … Despite 
this, urban employment probabilities are still better than rural for 
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many of these people. Thus, the sheer desperateness of the rural milieu 
would appear to ensure that the very tough urban labour market 
remains an attractive option’ (Van der Berg et al., 2002: 32-33). 
 
If Mount Frere typifies the underdevelopment and poverty of rural South Africa, 
Newcastle in many ways reflects the apartheid government’s state-driven 
development efforts in South Africa’s urban and peri-urban centres, where most 
of South Africa’s population lives today. Throughout the 1970s, the apartheid 
government developed Newcastle’s manufacturing sector in order to support the 
domestic iron and steel industries (Todes, 1997: 171). Newcastle’s two largest 
townships—Madadeni, which was built for wealthier black Africans, and 
Osizweni, which was built for poorer Zulu migrants—provided labour for its 
smelting and forging industries, though most of the jobs in heavy industry were 
reserved for white men. With robust state support, Newcastle had become the 
largest commercial centre in northern KwaZulu-Natal by 1984 (Todes, 1997: 
311; Hart, 2002: 140-141; Robbins et al., 2004: 13). 
 
However, with the contraction of the steel industry and deindustrialisation, the 
manufacturing base shifted towards primarily clothing and textile firms owned 
by Chinese immigrants from Taiwan, Hong Kong and mainland China, who 
were aggressively courted by the Newcastle municipality (Todes, 1997: 256 and 
270; Robbins et al., 2004: 14-15). The arrival of the clothing and textile 
manufacturing firms presaged a fundamental shift in labour dynamics in 
Newcastle: as the almost exclusively male, heavy-industry labour force declined 
sharply in the early 1990s, the importance of female-dominated manufacturing 
jobs in the clothing and textile industry to the local economy grew substantially 
(Hart, 2002: 159-60). These jobs, however, in part because of intense 
competition from foreign companies, are often worse paying than their heavy 
industry counterparts and are currently under threat by the National Bargaining 
Council for paying significantly below the legal minimum wage (Hart, 2002: 
165-6; Seekings and Nattrass, 2006). 
 
The story of Newcastle’s economic environment cannot be dissociated from the 
story of HIV/AIDS. Although Cape Town and the rural Eastern Cape are not 
immune to the ravages of the pandemic, KwaZulu-Natal has been particularly 
hard hit. HIV/AIDS has touched all aspects of South African society, upending 
livelihoods, families, and communities, and has disproportionately impacted the 
women, who account for 60 percent of HIV positive individuals in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and often serve as primary caregivers to their sick kin (Hunter, 2010: 3 
and 6; Seekings and Nattrass, 2006: 333). The disease’s broader significance for 
the local Newcastle economy, however, is less clear: As Hunter describes, in 
Mandeni, KwaZulu-Natal, an industrial town not too dissimilar from Newcastle, 
‘AIDS was little more than an inconvenient blip on the radar screens of most 
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employers in the area. Especially in low-wage sectors such as clothing, hundreds 
of people stood at the factory gates ready to replace sick workers’ (Hunter, 
2010: 114). 
 
Today, Newcastle is KwaZulu-Natal’s third largest city with over 330,000 
mostly Zulu residents, and manufacturing continues to dominate Newcastle’s 
municipal economy,1 although unemployment remains high, at over 37 percent 
in 2011 (Development Bank of Southern Africa, 2005: 159; Newcastle Local 
Municipality, 2007: 20 and 31; Statistics South Africa, 2011: 20). Newcastle’s 
industrial base has made the city a destination for migrants from rural areas in 
KwaZulu-Natal. However, declining employment and economic stagnation 
since the 1980s have severely limited the economic opportunities available to 
Newcastle residents, and by the 1990s black African individuals in Newcastle 
were making about a third less than those in other major metropolitan areas 
throughout KwaZulu-Natal. Consequently, migration pathways between 
Newcastle and larger metropolises, including Durban and Johannesburg, have 
developed (Todes, 1997: 287-330). 
 
There is some evidence that there are differences in mobility prospects between 
rural and urban areas. Girdwood and Leibbrandt (2009: 5-6), for example, found 
that educational mobility, which is often used as a proxy for more economically 
meaningful measures of social mobility, is substantially lower in rural than in 
urban locations. The study of social mobility in South Africa, however, is 
limited, in no small part because of a lack of available data (Seekings and 
Nattrass, 2006: 264). Thus, there is no available literature on social mobility in 
South Africa that distinguishes between mobility prospects in large metropolitan 
areas, such as Cape Town, and smaller urban areas, including Newcastle. By 
comparing perceptions of mobility in Cape Town, Mount Frere, and Newcastle 
it is possible to begin to explore how mobility prospects and pathways to 
mobility may differ in rural, urban, and metropolitan areas throughout South 
Africa. 
 
The rural population around Mount Frere and the urban population of Newcastle 
are located in a very different part of South African society compared to the 
black population of metropolitan Cape Town, which is demographically and 
economically unique for South Africa. These differences can be expected to 
influence how individuals perceive their economic environments and 
opportunities. In this paper, I thus explore how black individuals from both of 
these regions conceptualise economic inequality and social mobility in their own 
communities and in South Africa more generally through a series of interviews 
                                           
1
 Manufacturing comprised 58.3 percent of Newcastle’s local municipal gross geographic product in 2004 
(Newcastle Local Municipality, 2007: 20). 
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that I conducted in July of 2012. After discussing my methodology and briefly 
introducing the study’s participants, I then explore the perceptions of inequality 
and mobility articulated by these respondents, focusing in particular on how 






In order to develop a deeper understanding of perceptions of social mobility and 
economic inequality in South Africa, I conducted a series of fifteen in-depth 
ethnographic interviews using the interview instrument that I developed for the 
Cape Town interviewees (see Appendix A) during a ten-day visit to the rural 
communities around Mount Frere and a six-day visit to Newcastle. Though, 
unlike in Cape Town (where I was able to use the Cape Area Panel Study), 
neither Mount Frere nor Newcastle had a pre-existing dataset that could serve as 
a sampling frame, I nonetheless strove to interview a sample of individuals with 
diverse mobility experiences based on both economic background and outcome 
as described in Figure 1. Because the sampling methodology used in Mount 
Frere and Newcastle is less precise than that used in Cape Town, I pay less 
attention to the distinctions in the views among those in each of the four 
mobility categories during my analysis. However, by attempting to reproduce 
the sampling methodology used in Cape Town through purposive sampling, I 
was able to solicit a range of opinions representative of the broader Mount Frere 
and Newcastle populations. 
 
I conducted nine interviews with individuals from Mount Frere in the 
Luyengweni Location and Sivumele Location. Because, as a number of studies 
have found, livestock ownership is used as the primary savings vehicle for 
households in Mount Frere and is highly correlated with average income 
(Samson, 2002: 1165; de Swardt, 2005: 49), the quantity and kinds of animals 
owned by households (in addition to other luxury goods, such as cars and 
tractors) were used as proxies for household wealth. Furthermore, because the 
vast majority of individuals with ‘successful’ outcomes either does not remain in 
Mount Frere or achieves this success through migration to South Africa’s urban 
centres, I timed my visit to coincide with the winter break of South Africa’s 
tertiary institutions and used tertiary enrolment as a proxy for successful 
outcomes, while unemployment was again used as a proxy for unsuccessful 
outcomes. There is no tertiary institution in Mount Frere; thus, those who had 
‘successful’ outcomes have spent significant time outside of their rural 





CATEGORY 1 CATEGORY 2
CATEGORY 3 CATEGORY 4
Unsuccessful Outcome
Proxy: Unemployment or 
Underemployment
Successful Outcome






(large livestock/luxury goods 
holdings or parents with 
middle/upper income jobs)
Disadvantaged
Proxy: Lower Income 
Upbringing
 




The interviews were set up by Thobani Ncapai, a fieldworker for the Centre for 
Social Science Research at the University of Cape Town, who grew up in Mount 
Frere, and whose parents still live there. He also assisted in conducting the 
interviews (see Table 1). Ultimately, three of the nine interviewees were 
(approximately) from category 2 (MF-1, MF-3, and MF-4), two from category 4 
(MF-2 and MF-5), one from category 1 (MF-6), and three from either category 1 
or category 3 (MF-7, MF-8, and MF-9). Although category 3 was largely 
ignored in the Cape Town sample because there is little significant downward 
mobility for those near the top of the income distribution nationally (Seekings 
and Nattrass, 2006: 336), category 3 may be of more interest in rural settings 
because the rural elite is still relatively disadvantaged and thus, unlike the urban 























(See Fig. 1) 
MF-1 M 23 Livestock: 3 goats 
Teaching part time at a 
primary school and 
pursuing a BA (when 
money is available) at 
UNISA* 
Category 2 
MF-2 M 20 
Livestock: 39-43 cows, 
103 goats, 1 sheep 
Other: 1 car and 1 tractor 
Pursuing a BA in sciences 
at UFH** 
Category 4 
MF-3 F 23 Livestock: 4 donkeys 
Pursuing a degree in 
educational development at 
Coastal College, Durban 
Category 2 
MF-4 M 20 Livestock: 3 goats 
Pursuing a degree in 
agriculture at UFH** 
Category 2 
MF-5 M 22 
Livestock: 7 cows, 7 
goats, 14 sheep 
Other: 1 van and 1 tractor 
Pursuing a degree in 
engineering at CPUT† 
Category 4 
MF-6 M 25 Livestock: 2 cows, 2 goats 
Sometimes works teaching 
adults 
Category 1 
MF-7 F 20 
Livestock: 4 cows, 11 
sheep 
Unemployed; Matric (grade 
12) 
Category 1 or 3 
MF-8 F 23 Livestock: 5 cows, 6 goats 
Unemployed; Grade 11 
(failed grade 12 multiple 
times) 
Category 1 or 3 
MF-9 M 22 
Livestock: 6 cows, 15 
goats 
In school, grade 10 Category 1 or 3 
*The University of South Africa (UNISA) is Africa’s largest university with seven regional 
centres throughout South Africa. 
**University of Fort Hare. 
†Cape Peninsula University of Technology. 
 
 
Interviewees ranged in age from 20-25, with a median age of 22. Two-thirds of 
the interviewees were male, while one-third was female. Finally, there was an 
oversampling of successful outcomes; five out of the nine interviewees were 
attending tertiary institutions at the time of the interviews, a disproportionately 
high number for such a poor area. Because these individuals had spent 
significant time outside of the Mount Frere area, an effort was made to solicit a 
broader range of individuals pursuing tertiary educations in order to determine 
which views reflected their experiences in Mount Frere and which views 
reflected their experiences elsewhere. Three of the nine interviews were 




In Newcastle, I worked with a non-governmental, social development 
organisation with an extensive network of contacts in the Newcastle 
community—Khulisa Social Solutions—to solicit and conduct interviews. Over 
the course of six days, I conducted six interviews in the townships of Osizweni 
and Madadeni and in the city of Newcastle (see Table 2). There were an equal 
number of interviewees who could (approximately) be placed in each of the 
three mobility categories of interest. Because of the general lack of downward 
mobility among wealthier South Africans, category 3 was again disregarded in 
Newcastle, as it was in Cape Town. The interviewees ranged in age from 20-28, 
with a median age of 22.5 years old. Like in Mount Frere, two-thirds of the 
interviewees were male and one-third was female. All of the interviews were 
conducted in English.2 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the Newcastle interviewees 
 






(See Fig. 1) 
NC-1 M 24 
Advantaged background: Mother 
is a nurse and father is a pastor; 
attended private school and his 
family owns 2 cars 
Graduated from UCT 
with a BA in economics 
Category 4 
NC-2 F 24 
Disadvantaged background: 
Supports her two sisters (and 
their children) and lives with her 
grandfather 
Passed matric and now 
works at a retail store in 
Newcastle 
Category 2 
NC-3 M 21 
Disadvantaged background: 
Supports and lives with seven 
people (his uncle and aunt and 
their children, and his mother 
who doesn’t work) 
Works in the storeroom 
and in deliveries for an 
‘Asian’ clothing factory 
in Newcastle 
Category 2 
NC-4 M 28 
Disadvantaged background: Still 
lives at home in Madadeni 
Grade 11 education and 
is currently doing ‘piece 
jobs’ (works up to 3 
days a month) 
Category 1 
NC-5 M 21 
Disadvantaged background: 
Mother is unemployed and two 
brothers are also unemployed 
Passed grade 12 but just 
does ‘piece jobs’ as a 
gardener, but hasn’t had 
a job since February 
Category 1 
NC-6 F 20 
Advantaged background: Father 
is an HR manager and lives ‘in 
town’ 
Student at the University 
of Pretoria, studying 
psychology 
Category 4 
                                           
2
 NC-4 insisted on conducting the interview in English and without a translator, although he was much more 
comfortable speaking in Zulu than in English. Ultimately, I believe that NC-4 understood all of the questions that 
he was asked, although he may not have articulated his views as eloquently as he may have been able to in Zulu. 
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Although I sought to interview a group of individuals in both Mount Frere and 
Newcastle that was demographically similar to those whom I interviewed in 
Cape Town, the samples of interviewees in Mount Frere and Newcastle differ 
from the Cape Town sample in a number of important ways. The median age of 
the Cape Town interviewees (26 years old) was considerably higher than that of 
the Mount Frere and Newcastle samples (22 and 22.5 years old, respectively). 
Additionally, a much larger proportion of the Mount Frere and Newcastle 
samples had spent a significant period of time living in a different part of South 
Africa than those from Cape Town. Finally, the educational attainment of the 
Mount Frere and Newcastle samples was much higher than that of the Cape 
Town sample, although the opposite is probably true of the broader populations 
in these three regions. These demographic differences may make comparisons 
among the three samples difficult; however, by analysing these samples, it is 
possible to begin to probe how location shapes perceptions of social mobility in 
South Africa. 
 
Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) conceptualisation of Grounded Theory and Glasser’s 
(1998) practical manual on the topic, Doing Grounded Theory, guided my 
analysis of the Mount Frere and Newcastle interviews. As mentioned above, 
Telzak (2012) focused extensively on how mobility experience shaped 
perceptions. However, I ultimately pay less attention to the often-subtle 
differences in views among members of the four different mobility categories 
because my sampling methodology in both Mount Frere and Newcastle was less 
precise and because the sample sizes in both locations were considerably smaller 
than in Cape Town. Additionally, Hunter’s (2010) ethnography of HIV/AIDS in 
Mandeni—which found that views of love, sex, rights, and HIV/AIDS are 
deeply gendered—suggests that perceptions of economic opportunity may 
divide along gender lines. Because of the heavy male bias in the samples, 
however, I avoid drawing conclusions about how and if perceptions of mobility 
in these two areas are shaped by gender. Instead, through this study, I seek to 
paint a preliminary picture of how black individuals in Mount Frere and 
Newcastle conceptualise their economic environments and begin to investigate 
how and why their perceptions of inequality and mobility differ from those 
articulated by black Cape Townians. 
 
 
Results: perceptions of social mobility among 
black individuals in Mount Frere and Newcastle 
 
In this section, I examine perceptions of social mobility in the rural areas around 
Mount Frere and in Newcastle through a close examination of the interviews. 
After exploring how the respondents in Mount Frere and Newcastle 
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conceptualise economic inequality, I then examine the primary mobility 
pathways emphasised during the interviews. Finally, I investigate the 
interviewees’ expectations of both intra- and inter-generational mobility. 
Throughout this section, I seek to highlight how local economic conditions have 
shaped the perceptions of mobility articulated by these respondents and, thus, to 
suggest how others from similar economic backgrounds may conceptualise their 





In order to facilitate discussion about economic inequality in South Africa, 
respondents, like those in Cape Town, were shown a series of illustrations 
depicting the distribution of income in South African society (see Figure 2) and 
asked a number of questions about the nature of this inequality. During the 
interviews, respondents expressed a range of opinions about the economic 
stratification of South Africa, which appears to be shaped by both local 
economic conditions and the individual’s own economic position within the 
local community. Furthermore, although respondents in both Mount Frere and 
Newcastle acknowledged the continued relationship between race and class, 
their understandings of this relationship differed greatly from the views 
articulated by the Cape Town respondents: those from Mount Frere were 
ultimately less focused on this relationship than those in Cape Town and 
respondents from Newcastle had a much more accurate understanding of the 






Figure 2: Pictures depicting different models of the economic 
stratification of South African society 
 
 
While four of the nine individuals interviewed in Mount Frere chose type 1 
when asked how they would describe South African society—indicating that 
they believed there was a substantial gap between a relatively small group of 
wealthy individuals and a much larger group of poor individuals—the remaining 
five individuals selected either type 2 or type 3—suggesting that they thought 
there was a much more equitable distribution of income and a much larger 
middle class in South Africa (see Table 3). Although there is little in the 
interviews to suggest why this split in perceptions of economic inequality exists, 
upon closer examination of those who selected type 1, a conspicuous pattern 
emerges. All four individuals who chose type 1 were currently studying at 
tertiary institutions outside of Mount Frere, generally in urban areas where the 
differences between wealth and poverty are more pronounced. In contrast, all of 
those who selected types 2 or 3 had spent little, if any, time living outside of 
Mount Frere—where everyone is relatively poor—and thus may not have been 










(# of individuals) 
Type 2 
(# of individuals) 
Type 3 
(# of individuals) 
Type 4 
(# of individuals) 
Mount Frere 4 4 1 0 
Newcastle 3 1 2 0 
 
 
In fact, there is some, if limited, evidence for this hypothesis. MF-5, who is 
studying engineering in Cape Town, described how ‘if you look at different 
[townships], even in Khayelitsha in Cape Town, there are too many poor people. 
There are [so] many [poor] people in [Khayelitsha]. … [But] when you go to the 
suburbs, there are only a few suburbs’, and thus only a few ‘rich guys’. He thus 
believed that South Africa closely resembled ‘type 1’, with most of the 
population near the bottom of the income distribution and only a small elite of 
wealthier individuals. In contrast, those who had spent their whole lives in 
Mount Frere did not realise the extent of the poverty that exists in urban 
townships; rather, they tended to view individuals in townships, like MF-7 did, 
as ‘in the middle’ with ‘cars …, big houses and electricity’.  Even MF-8, who 
recognised that some people in the townships ‘are suffering … [and] they just 
manage to get [enough] food to have something to eat’, still ‘would put [most of 
the people from townships] in the middle’. Thus, those who had not spent a 
significant amount of time outside of Mount Frere believed that the distribution 
of income was much more equitable and that there was a relatively large middle 
class. 
 
Almost all of those from Mount Frere, however, to some degree conceptualised 
economic inequality in terms of the spatial organisation and migratory patterns 
of black South Africans. MF-7, the unemployed 20 year-old woman, for 
example, described why society looked like type 2: while most of the black 
people live in ‘rural areas’ and are poor, because ‘we do not have jobs’, the 
‘middle … live[] in towns[hips]’, and the ‘rich … are in the suburbs or in the 
towns’.  MF-6, the part-time adult educator, expressed similar views but more 
directly in terms of the migratory patterns that he has observed in Mount Frere: 
‘In South Africa, most of the people’ are in rural areas and are poor, but the 
many who ‘migrate from this place in the rural areas, [to] the urban areas’ are 
wealthier. 
 
Like those from Mount Frere, the Newcastle interviewees were split between 
those who chose type 1 when asked how they would describe South African 
society and those who chose either type 2 or type 3, although for different 
reasons than the Mount Frere respondents. Unlike in Mount Frere, the 
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conceptualisation of economic inequality in Newcastle appears to primarily 
reflect the economic position of the respondents. Those from categories 1 and 
4—those who had experienced relatively little mobility—tended to highlight the 
widespread poverty and relatively small upper classes in South Africa, when 
justifying their decisions to select type 1. NC-6, for example, a student at the 
University of Pretoria who is from a relatively well-to-do family, argued, ‘I just 
feel like there are more people living in poor conditions. … Looking at 
Newcastle there aren’t that many rich people. So I think type 1 is [what] 
Newcastle and all of South Africa [look like]’. Likewise, those from category 1 
stressed this widespread poverty when selecting type 1. As NC-4, an 
unemployed 28 year old, explained, ‘Most people [like myself] are unemployed. 
… [Those] in the middle’ comprise a relatively small group that ‘support[s] 
other people, when they need something … like food, or shelter, or clothes’. In 
contrast, those in category 2—those who had experienced a considerable degree 
of mobility—tended to believe that most individuals in South Africa were 
situated similarly in the income distribution. NC-3, the 23 year old who works in 
a clothing factory, selected type 3 because ‘here in South Africa we do not have 
too many people who are rich. Most are in the middle, like me’. 
 
Despite differences in how individuals from Mount Frere and Newcastle 
conceptualised the distribution of income in South Africa, the vast majority of 
individuals from both places recognised the continued relationship between race 
and class in post-apartheid South Africa. MF-4, who is pursuing a degree in 
agriculture at the University of Fort Hare (UFH), for example, argued that he 
‘would place the white people on top because they are ... richer than us black 
people [who] are at the bottom’. Similarly, NC-2, the retail store employee, 
argued that the white people are ‘at the top. … I don’t know if it’s their culture 
or what but they are’ at the top, while black Africans are primarily on the 
bottom, although ‘they can be’ near the top. 
 
The Mount Frere interviewees, however, were ultimately much less focused on 
the economic position of other racial groups than their Cape Town counterparts. 
Whereas those from Cape Town volunteered their views about the racialised 
stratification of income in South African society, those from Mount Frere, 
perhaps because the population of rural areas in South Africa is almost entirely 
black African,3 focused extensively on the distribution of income within the 
black community and needed to be prompted to speak about the location of 
white and coloured individuals within this distribution. As MF-3, the 23 year-
old woman pursuing an education degree in Durban, said unsolicited when she 
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first saw the income-distribution illustrations, ‘I am not going to talk about the 
white South Africans; I will talk about the blacks’. 
 
In contrast, those from Newcastle, like those from Cape Town, more willingly 
shared their views about the racialised distribution of income in South Africa. 
However, they ultimately had a much more accurate understanding of the 
changing nature of the relationship between race and class and the increasing 
black African presence in the middle and top of the income distribution. NC-1, 
the UCT graduate, described how ‘back in the day, [black Africans] would have 
been [only] 0.05’ of the upper classes. Today, he argued, most of the white 
people are still ‘at the top … [but they only comprise] 0.5’ of these classes. 
Similarly, NC-2 maintained that ‘45 percent’ of the top is ‘black’ mostly 
because of ‘BEE [Black Economic Empowerment]’ programs, and NC-6 
described how ‘the black people’ are ‘mixed up in the bottom and … the top’, 
though she later qualified her statements about the degree of black penetration 
into the upper classes. There were some individuals who maintained, like those 
in Cape Town, that there were very few black South Africans near the top of the 
income distribution (see NC-4 and NC-5). However, in contrast to the Cape 
Town interviewees, the majority of respondents maintained that the upper 
classes had become relatively integrated since the end of apartheid, perhaps 
reflecting the significantly larger proportion of black middle- and upper-class 
individuals in Newcastle than in Cape Town. 
 
This more integrated conception of the distribution of income in South Africa 
may ultimately impact how blacks from Newcastle formulate their goals. NC-6, 
the University of Pretoria student, originally claimed that she had only a ‘zero-
to-ten’ percent chance of making it to the top, because she’s not ‘business 
minded’. However, near the end of the interview, after I asked her whether she 
knew that approximately 50 percent of middle and upper class individuals in 
South Africa are black African, she responded ‘Oh, okay, wow’, that ‘make[s] it 
more possible for me to get to the top. Wow, is it 50? That’s a lot. … I [would 
say] it’s more possible than … ten’ percent now. 
 
This analysis ultimately suggests that local economic conditions may shape how 
individuals in South Africa conceptualise economic inequality. Whereas those in 
Cape Town were focused extensively on the continued relationship between race 
and class—which is particularly characteristic of the Western Cape—those from 
Mount Frere—who live exclusively among other black Africans—were less 
interested in the economic positions of other racial groups, and those from 
Newcastle—where the top and middle of the income distribution are 
significantly more integrated, as they are in most of South Africa—had a much 
more accurate understanding of the changing nature of the relationship between 
race and class since the end of apartheid. Furthermore, as the Newcastle 
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interviews reveal, how individuals conceptualise economic inequality—
especially the integration of the middle and top of the income distribution—may 
influence how accessible they believe the higher income classes are and 
ultimately their motivation for reaching these classes. Perceptions of economic 
inequality can, of course, change if individuals widen their economic horizons, 
as they did for those from Mount Frere who attended tertiary institutions outside 
of rural areas. However, the ultimate determinant of how individuals 
conceptualise the distribution of income in South Africa appears to be local 
economic conditions, not broader national trends. 
 
 













Mobility experience of the Cape Town respondents influenced perceptions of the 
distribution of income in South Africa. While those who had experienced little social 
mobility—those in categories 1 and 4—tended to emphasise the insurmountable gap 
between rich and poor that ultimately precluded the emergence of a middle class, those 
in category 2, perhaps because they have experienced some degree of upward mobility, 
could better imagine pathways from the bottom to the top and, thus, highlighted the 
presence of a robust middle class by selecting type 2. Nearly all interviewees, however, 
stressed the continued association of wealth and class in South Africa and thus believed 












The Mount Frere interviews suggest that location influences perceptions of economic 
inequality. All four individuals who chose type 1 were currently studying at tertiary 
institutions outside of Mount Frere, generally in urban areas where the differences 
between wealth and poverty are more pronounced. In contrast, all of those who selected 
types 2 or 3 had spent little, if any, time living outside of Mount Frere—where everyone 
is relatively poor—and thus may not have been exposed to the full magnitude of 
economic inequality in South Africa. Although those from Mount Frere recognised the 
continued association of race and class, the Mount Frere interviewees were ultimately 







Like those from Cape Town, the Newcastle interviewees in both Categories 1 and 4 
tended to highlight the widespread poverty and relatively small upper classes in South 
Africa by selecting type 1. In contrast, those from category 2 highlighted the existence 
of a broader middle class in South Africa by selected types 2 and 3. Although those in 
Newcastle highlighted the racialised nature of the income distribution in South Africa, 
they ultimately had a much more accurate understanding of the changing nature of the 




                                           
4
 Comparisons to Cape Town are drawn from Telzak, 2012. 
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Shoots and ladders: pathways to mobility in Mount 
Frere and Newcastle 
 
Local economic conditions also influenced how respondents from both Mount 
Frere and Newcastle conceptualised the available pathways to mobility. Like the 
Cape Town interviewees, those from Mount Frere and Newcastle recognised the 
importance of education for social mobility. However, unlike those from Cape 
Town, the interviewees identified politics and government employment as the 
single most important mobility pathway and highlighted the pitfalls of illegal-
drug and alcohol abuse, which the respondents claimed was ravaging their 
communities. This next section closely examines the mobility pathways 
identified by the interviewees, noting how their local economic environments 
shape their perceptions of these pathways. 
 
 
 ‘Without an education you cannot go anywhere’ 
 
All the interviewees from Mount Frere and Newcastle, like those from Cape 
Town, recognised the importance of education—and in particular, tertiary 
qualifications—for upward mobility. MF-3, the tertiary student studying in 
Durban, for example, described how ‘an education’ ‘is the most important thing’ 
to get to the top, and MF-1, the student at UNISA, asserted that people achieve 
mobility ‘by getting educated’. Similarly, NC-5, the unemployed gardener, 
underscored the importance of education to gaining employment: ‘Education is 
the most important thing’, he argued, to being ‘more easily employed’. And half 
of the Newcastle respondents (NC-4, NC-5, and NC-6) independently 
proclaimed, that ‘Education is the key to everything’, using nearly identical 
phraseology as KS-7 did during his interview in Cape Town (Telzak, 2012: 26-
29). NC-3, the factory worker with a matric degree, thus, described the 
necessary steps to upward mobility in South Africa: First, ‘go to school. [Then] 
finish school, [and] go to tertiary, and only after tertiary should you start looking 
for a job’. 
 
In fact, those from Mount Frere and Newcastle were even more emphatic about 
the importance of education for mobility than those from Cape Town. Not only 
did many think that education facilitated economic success (like all of those in 
Cape Town did), but they also believed that mobility was impossible without an 
education. MF-6, the part-time adult educator, for example, unequivocally 
declared, ‘To move from the bottom to the top you need an education’, and MF-
4, the agricultural major at UFH, stated flatly, ‘To get to the top you have to go 
to university’. Education is so intertwined with upward mobility in Mount Frere 
that many defined the upper classes not by wealth, per se, but by educational 
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attainment. As MF-3 concluded, ‘I define those who are rich by their education’. 
MF-7, the unemployed matric-degree holder, reflected MF-3’s sentiments 
exactly: ‘The people at the top … [are those who are] educated’.  Similarly, 
those from Newcastle stressed the impossibility of upward mobility without an 
education. As both NC-4 and NC-5 argued, ‘Without an education, you are 
going nowhere’.5 
 
Like the respondents in Cape Town, those from Newcastle offered a 
combination of individualistic and structural explanations for why individuals 
failed to graduate from high school and/or pursue tertiary qualifications. NC-2, 
for example, argued that those who drop out of school are ‘lazy’, while NC-3 
described how ‘going to school without any money, no shoes, no food, and no 
uniforms is a very difficult situation’. Unlike in Cape Town, however, there did 
not seem to be a consistent relationship between the opinions that individuals 
expressed and their economic backgrounds; both NC-2 and NC-3 were in 
category 2. 
 
In contrast, those from Mount Frere tended to offer a different explanation for 
why so few of their peers had successfully completed high school and tertiary 
degrees: they faulted their parents’ generation for not instilling in them the 
importance of pursuing education. As MF-1 described, ‘Our parents are 
uneducated because … they had cows and goats, and didn’t see the need to go to 
school’ and, as a result, a lot of their children also ‘do not see the need for 
education’. Those who do end up pursuing an education are thus often forced to 
by their circumstances. As both MF-1 and MF-6 described, it is those who ‘see 
that their parents have no cattle—[see] that they have no chance to survive 
without education—[who] end up getting educated’. MF-4, thus, hoped that ‘as 
the generations grow up [i.e., as time goes on] … parents will [start to] advise 











                                           
5
 While this quote is from the interview with NC-4, NC-5 articulated identical sentiments, but in slightly 
different words: ‘Without education you cannot go anywhere’.  
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All of those in Cape Town recognised the importance of education for upward 
mobility. Those in categories 1 and 2, however, stressed the large structural barriers 
to educational attainment, while those in category 4 faulted individuals for not 
valuing education and taking advantage of the educational opportunities available to 











Those in Mount Frere were more emphatic than those in Cape Town about the 
importance of education for upward mobility. They, however, faulted their parents’ 







Those in Newcastle also emphasised the impossibility of upward mobility without 
education. Individuals in Newcastle, like those from Cape Town, offered a 
combination of individualistic and structural explanations for why matric and tertiary 
completion rates were so low. 
 
 
Politics and political connections: the only way up 
 
As the previous section demonstrated, individuals from Mount Frere and 
Newcastle appear to have very similar views as those from Cape Town about the 
importance of education for facilitating upward mobility. However, although 
those from Mount Frere and Newcastle believed that education was necessary 
for upward mobility, they did not think that it was sufficient; rather, in contrast 
to the Cape Town interviewees, they stressed the singular importance of politics 
and political connections for social mobility. Whereas those in Newcastle 
highlighted the important role that politics and government tenders play in 
facilitating success, those in Mount Frere described how underdevelopment of 
rural areas resulted in few opportunities for mobility besides running for 
political office or working for the government.  
 
In Newcastle, respondents repeatedly emphasised the important role of political 
office and government work in facilitating upward mobility. NC-1, the UCT 
graduate, in response to a question about whether it was possible for an 
individual to ‘get to the top’, replied, ‘If you’re involved in politics, yes! I think 
it’s very much possible’.  Similarly, NC-2, the retail shop employee, when asked 
which individuals were in the upper classes, exclaimed, ‘It would be the 
government of course!’  And NC-5, described how, those who are ‘working for 




These views may reflect both the progress that South Africa has made in 
integrating the public service through aggressive affirmative action programs 
and the increasing role of the public sector in the South African labour market. 
Though black individuals comprised the majority of the public sector in South 
Africa during apartheid, they were largely relegated to low-level (and 
consequently low-pay) positions with little opportunity of advancement 
(Cameron, 2005: 77). However, since the end of apartheid, the proportion of 
non-white senior managers in the public service more than doubled from 35 
percent in 1995 to 87 percent in 2011 (Cameron, 2005: 82; Public Service 
Commission, 2011: 50). In contrast, management positions in the private sector 
still remain predominantly white; only 24 percent of senior management 
positions in the private sector were occupied by non-white South Africans in 
2012 (Commission for Employment Equity, 2013: 9). Thus, the public sector 
may present the primary option for black African economic advancement in 
South Africa. 
 
At the same time, public sector employment has ballooned since the end of 
apartheid: in 2005, 1.6 million of the 8.6 million (or 18.6 percent) of formal 
sector employees were employed by the public sector (Bosch, 2006: 17). Today, 
nearly 23 percent of all formal sector employees work for the South African 
government (UASA, 2012). And these figures exclude individuals who are 
employed indirectly by the government, through companies that derive most of 
their revenue from government tenders. Furthermore, public sector employees 
earn a significant wage premium over their private sector counterparts—up to 35 
percent more, according to Bosch (2006: 22)—perhaps explaining why those 
from Newcastle believed that government workers were in the middle- and 
upper-class strata, while their private sector counterparts were not. 
 
Those from Newcastle, however, stressed an alternate route to mobility: 
business ownership. NC-2, for example, later qualified her statement about the 
upper classes being comprised entirely of government officials: ‘Sometimes [the 
upper classes] work for the government’, NC-2 argued, but other times ‘they 
have their own businesses’. As NC-4, the unemployed 28 year old, later 
explained, ‘Most of [the middle and upper classes] are politicians’, but there are 
also ‘those who are self-employed and own their businesses’. These successful 
business owners, however, according to individuals from Newcastle, were 
ultimately reliant on government contracts and political connections. NC-4, 
upon further questioning, described the individuals who reached the middle and 
upper classes through business as those who own ‘[government] tender 
businesses’. And, according to NC-1, ‘If you look at the guys who [] actually … 
get the tenders, [they] are the guys who are involved in politics’. As NC-6, the 
University of Pretoria student, put it: ‘It’s all about politics nowadays, although 
we don’t want to admit it. … There’s tenders this, there’s [tenders] that, and it 
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all goes via politics’.  Thus, it’s rarely business alone that facilitates mobility; 
rather, ‘it’s business plus politics’.  
 
Those in Mount Frere also highlighted the distinctly political character of the 
upper-income classes. MF-6, the part time adult educator, described how being 
‘educated’ is important for getting to the top of the income distribution, ‘but 
these days the people who are rich are politicians, [those] working in parliament 
and municipal workers’. Similarly, MF-1, the education student at UNISA, 
argued that the middle and upper classes are ‘government workers, ... [those 
who] are in politics’. Thus, MF-4, the agricultural major at UFH, stated, ‘If you 
are in politics, … you can get to the top’. 
 
 
Table 4: Key infrastructural and educational development indicators for 
Alfred Nzo Municipal District, Newcastle, and Cape Town 
 











for Lighting  
(%) 
Matric Degrees 
for those 20+  
(%) 
Alfred Nzo 5 6 6 46 13 
Newcastle 56 71 50 87 33 
Cape Town 88 94 75 94 30 
 
Source: Statistics South Africa, 2011: 16, 20, 26, 39, 43, and 48. 
 
 
However, because of the underdevelopment of rural areas, the Mount Frere 
interviewees did not also recognise business ownership as a significant pathway 
to upward mobility; rather, they stressed that running for public office and 
government employment were among the only pathways available to them for 
upward mobility. According to the 2011 South African Census, Alfred Nzo 
District Municipality, like the vast majority of rural areas in South Africa, 
lagged behind both Newcastle and Cape Town in a number of key infrastructural 
and educational development indicators (see Table 4). These figures are, 
however, likely to overstate the development of the rural communities around 
Mount Frere; the Alfred Nzo District Municipality encompasses a number of 
small- and medium-sized towns, which are most likely significantly more 
developed than their surrounding rural communities. 
 
Many of those from Mount Frere bemoaned this underdevelopment and 
ultimately faulted it for circumscribing their opportunities for mobility. MF-5, 
the CPUT student, described how ‘if you look in rural areas there are no 
computers in school. … If you read their textbooks—they have those new NCS 
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curriculum ones—they say “To find out more about this, go to the nearest 
library” ’, but there are no libraries. And MF-4 lamented the general lack of 
‘infrastructure’ in rural communities. As MF-9, the unemployed 22 year-old 
tenth grader, pleaded, ‘Instead of [just] focusing on townships, [the government 
should] make sure to concentrate on rural areas’ and ‘support them’. Thus, 
‘people in rural areas,’ according to MF-9, ‘don’t have any information about 
what is happening’—that is, they don’t have access to the same opportunities 
that those elsewhere do—‘and [therefore] there are few people from rural areas 
who are rich’. If the government did ‘improv[e] the infrastructure of the rural 
areas,’ MF-4 was confident, there would be increased opportunities for mobility. 
If there were a ‘tar-road here’, MF-4 gave as an example, ‘people would be able 
to open a car-wash’. In fact, the only significant ‘private sector’ opportunities 
that individuals from rural areas could pursue, according to some of the 
respondents, were not in the private sector at all: MF-8, the unemployed 23 
year-old eleventh grade student, argued that the best ‘companies’ to work for are 
those ‘good companies, like the department of education, health and so on’.  
 
Thus, as MF-8 indicated, the only potential for mobility available to individuals 
from rural areas was through politics and government employment. MF-1, 
described the ideal mobility pathway to the upper classes: ‘For example, let’s 
say you are a ward committee [member], you have to look after people in the 
community. Then next you get the step to be a councillor, after a councillor you 
are a mayor, and you follow those steps until you reach the top’. In fact, both he 
and MF-4 conceptualised the distribution of income in society entirely in terms 
of the distribution of governmental resources. MF-1 believed that society 
resembled type 2 because ‘we get money from the [national] government and 
the [national] government is distributing the money to the local government’ and 
the local government is then distributing the money ‘to the local communities’. 
In contrast, MF-6 thought that society more closely resembled type 1 because 
‘in South Africa the money is given to a few people, like ministers in 
government and it goes down or is lost’. 
 
These views appear to merely reflect the reality of social mobility in Mount 
Frere, and many other rural communities, where government employment and 
political office may be the only pathways available. As du Toit et al.(2007: 526) 
describe in their examination of social capital in Mount Frere, ‘What stable and 
secure livelihoods there are in the area are those linked to the state and local 
government. In turn, access to these is governed by a local elite that is both 
traditional and political and which [abuses] its economic clout and connections 
with state power’. Respondents from Mount Frere thus saw government 
employment as the only mobility opportunities available to them; six of the nine 





However, the fact that politics and governmental employment are viewed as the 
primary mobility pathways in both Mount Frere and Newcastle may ultimately 
have detrimental repercussions for South African society. Della Porta and 
Pizzorno (1996: 85-7), in their investigation of corruption in Italy, found that 
‘business politicians’—or those who entered politics because it was their ‘sole 
avenue to upward mobility’—were much more prone to corruption. The 
perceptions of politics as among the only pathways to upward mobility 
expressed in this section may thus help explain at least part of South Africa’s 
















Although those from Cape Town recognised the importance of politics and affirmative 
action to upward mobility, they ultimately stressed that access to social networks with 











Those from Mount Frere stressed that the underdevelopment of rural areas 
circumscribed their opportunities for upward mobility and argued that running for 
public office and government employment were among the only significant available 







Those in Newcastle also emphasised the important role of political office and 
government work in facilitating upward mobility. Although the Newcastle respondents 
stressed another pathway to mobility—business ownership—they believed that business 
owners were ultimately reliant on government contracts and political connections. 
 
 
Drugs and alcohol: the highest hurdle 
 
Respondents from both Mount Frere and Newcastle repeatedly attributed 
immobility among their peers to illegal-drug and alcohol use. Drug and alcohol 
use, the interviewees argued, led to extremely high school drop-out rates, thus 
stifling a primary pathway to upward mobility. As MF-1 described, ‘A lot of 
[my peers] do not see the need of education because most of them are using 
drugs’. MF-6 also faulted drugs and alcohol for poor educational outcomes for 
                                           
6
 For a detailed and insightful analysis of post-apartheid corruption, see Hyslop (2005). South Africa’s Special 
Investigating Unit estimates that US$3.8 billion (or 20-25 percent of the government’s procurement budget) is 
lost to corruption (The Economist, 2011). 
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those who remained in school: ‘Talking about our youth, most of them are 
[taking] drugs, [or] drinking too much alcohol. That is why they are not going to 
school or, if they are [going to] school, their minds are not there; their minds are 
on dagga [marijuana], cigarettes, and alcohol’.  As NC-3 concluded, more 
people were not leaving poverty—that is, few people were mobile—because 
‘poor people are becoming more and more [addicted to] drugs, … [so] they [are] 
dropping out of school’. 
 
Perhaps more fundamentally, however, those from Mount Frere and Newcastle 
believed that drugs and alcohol blinded individuals to their futures and thus 
circumscribed their mobility. As NC-5 explained, ‘South Africans [who] use 
drugs … [do] not think about the future; they [only] think about the now’. MF-2 
echoed NC-5’s sentiments: Poor individuals ‘are using drugs that manipulate 
their minds and cause them … not to think about tomorrow’s lives’, that is their 
future. Thus, MF-2 claimed, drug and alcohol users do not have a ‘goal and 
vision in life’ and will never ‘reach the top’. And drug and alcohol abuse, 
according to the respondents, also circumscribed the mobility of the addicts’ 
children: As MF-8 argued, ‘People … spend all [their] money with friends 
buying alcohol. So at the end of the day [their] children do not have money to 
[continue] their studies because [their parents] did not save money. … [Thus so 
many people] end up on the bottom’. 
 
Although most studies indicate that illegal-drug use in South Africa is a 
comparatively minor problem (Brook et al., 2006; Peltzer et al., 2010), alcohol 
use seems to be much more prevalent. Per capita alcohol consumption among 
South Africans is more or less average, compared to other countries; however, 
alcohol consumption among those who drink is extraordinarily high (WHO, 
2011). According to the South African Department of Health, over one-third of 
African males and over two-fifths of African females who consume alcohol 
binge-drink for a significant portion of the weekend, presumably because most 
South Africans receive their pay checks on Friday (Department of Social 
Development, 2007: 9;  The Economist, 2011). Although there is some drug and 
alcohol abuse in South Africa, these statistics indicate that individuals may 
overestimate the prevalence and thus the impact of these actions.  
 
Additionally, none of the respondents acknowledged the possibility that this 
alcohol and drug abuse was symptomatic of a society without a significant 
degree of economic mobility, not its cause. The interviews suggest a possible 
explanation for this trend: by blaming the immobility of their peers on addiction, 
the respondents could conceptualise a simple and straightforward solution to 
South Africa’s economic woes: ending this addiction. NC-2, for example, 
argued that ‘the youth are dropping out of schools, doing drugs, alcohol, 
everything’. But, she claimed, ‘If [they] can [instead] focus, and know what they 
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want in life, they can be at the top’. Similarly, NC-5 vividly described why there 
would be fewer poor people in the next ten years: ‘Those who are doing drugs 
will die’, he explained, and everyone else, who didn’t do drugs, will ‘[go] to 
[educational] institutions. … Therefore, the number of people with money will 
increase’. This analysis, thus, suggests that, although focusing on illegal-drug 
and alcohol abuse has merit from a public-health point-of-view, it risks 
















Although some of those from category 4 mentioned the hazards of alcohol use, the 
vast majority of Cape Town interviewees did not see drug and alcohol abuse as a 










 In contrast to those from Cape Town, those from Mount Frere saw illegal-drug and 
alcohol abuse, which led to extremely high school drop-out rates and blinded 
individuals to their futures, as among the most significant hurdles to upward mobility 
in their communities. The Mount Frere interviewees, however, failed to acknowledge 
that the high rates of drug and alcohol abuse could perhaps be symptomatic of a 







Like those from Mount Frere, the Newcastle interviewees emphasised the pitfalls of 
drug and alcohol abuse and stressed that drug and alcohol use was the cause, and not 
a symptom, of the relative lack of mobility in Newcastle. 
 
 
Expectations of social mobility in Mount Frere and 
Newcastle 
 
Expectations of intra-generational mobility in Mount Frere largely corresponded 
with expected educational outcomes. Those in Mount Frere, however, were 
ultimately less optimistic that their economic gains would be passed on to their 
children. Nonetheless, for many of the Mount Frere interviewees, especially 
those from poorer backgrounds, intergenerational mobility was only a secondary 
concern; ensuring the mobility of their younger siblings was more pressing. In 
contrast, expectations of intra- and inter-generational mobility in Newcastle 
closely mirrored those in Cape Town and reflected previous mobility 
experience. The interviews, however, like those in Cape Town, ultimately reveal 





Those from Mount Frere believed that their mobility depended entirely on 
whether or not they received tertiary qualifications. Those who were pursuing 
post-secondary qualifications were very optimistic about their mobility. MF-4, 
the UFH agriculture student, for example, asserted, ‘I can move from the bottom 
to the top’ because once ‘I pass my degree, I am going to get a job and have 
money’. In contrast, those who did not expect to pass matric and enter a 
technikon or university thought that their chances of economic success were 
incredibly low. ‘The problem’ is, MF-9, the 22 year-old tenth grader, explained, 
‘I am not doing well at all in my studies’. ‘If I make sure that I am studying 
hard’, he continued, ‘maybe I can be on top’ but the chances that will happen 
‘are few’. 
 
The Mount Frere interviewees who expected to be economically mobile, 
however, ultimately viewed this mobility as more precarious than those in Cape 
Town did. While the Cape Town respondents were incredibly optimistic that 
their own economic success would guarantee that of their children, those from 
Mount Frere believed that they ultimately had a modest impact on their 
children’s economic outcomes. MF-6, for example, who claimed that he ‘will 
be’ at the top, maintained that all he could do to help his children succeed was 
‘to call them to sit with me and explain to them … [that they must] go to school 
… [and] not drop out before they finish’. In the end, however, he insinuated that 
it was up to them to succeed. MF-2, the other UFH student, was even franker in 
his assertions: MF-2 thought that the ‘chances are very good’ that his children 
will reach the top if they ‘[do] what I tell’ them. But ultimately, MF-2 argued, ‘it 
depends on’ them. 
 
Although those from Mount Frere volunteered their views on intergenerational 
mobility when prompted, they were generally less focused on the mobility of 
their children than on the mobility of younger siblings. As MF-3 articulated, her 
primary motivation for pursuing a tertiary degree was to get ‘a job [that] I will 
work in for [] ten years [in order to] make sure that I am helping my younger 
brothers to study and look[ing] after my home’. Only then would she consider 
pursuing her own dreams of ‘hav[ing] my own business as a fashion designer’. 
Similarly, MF-4 described, ‘I must go to school so that I can get money to 
support those who follow me—[my younger siblings]—because [my family has] 
got nothing’. These views suggest that obligations to family in Mount Frere may 
ultimately circumscribe the dreams and ambitions of economically mobile 
Mount Frere residents. 
 
The expectations of mobility in Newcastle, in contrast, were greatly influenced 
by mobility experience and closely resembled those expressed by Cape Town 
residents. Like in Cape Town, those who were economically successful—those 
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in categories 2 and 4—expressed optimism about their own mobility and that of 
their children. NC-1, the UCT graduate, for example, proclaimed that his 
‘chances [of reaching the top] are pretty good’ and that his children ‘should do 
well for themselves … because they have me’ and my success. And NC-2, the 
retail shop employee, described how she ‘will move’ up and how she will ‘make 
sure that, once I am educated, [my children] will get the [best] education ever’ 
and thus have ‘many opportunities’ to reach the top. In contrast, those who had 
not experienced a considerable degree of economic success, were generally less 
optimistic about their own mobility. NC-4, the unemployed 28 year old, for 
example, said that ‘maybe’ he could reach the top, but the exasperation in his 
voice was audible.  
 
In the end, the interviews reveal the potential emergence of a mobility trap in 
both Mount Frere and Newcastle. Those who had limited expectations about 
their own mobility—in Mount Frere, those who did not expect to receive tertiary 
qualifications and in Newcastle, those who were economically unsuccessful—
also had limited expectations about their children’s ability to transcend their 
economic circumstances. NC-4 ultimately believed that ‘there is no chance’ his 
children would reach the top; as he predicted, it was more likely that ‘they will 
end up in prison by doing bad things in the community’. Similarly, MF-8, the 
unemployed matric graduate, claimed that the chances that her children will 
reach the top are ‘big if I can find a job, work hard [so that I can] take them into 
school’. But if not, she insinuated, her children had few chances for upward 
mobility. As I hypothesised in Telzak (2012), if parents feel that there is little 
hope that their children’s socioeconomic status will differ from their own, then 
they may be less inclined to invest significant resources in their children’s 






























While interviewees from category 2 and 4 were optimistic about their own and their 
children’s mobility, those from category 1 were pessimistic about the economic 
opportunities available to them and their children, perhaps indicating the 










 Those from Mount Frere believed that their mobility depended entirely on whether or 
not they received tertiary qualifications. In contrast to those from Cape Town, 
however, the Mount Frere interviewees believed that they ultimately had a modest 
impact on their children’s economic outcomes, suggesting that a ‘mobility trap’ may 
also exist in Mount Frere. The Mount Frere respondents, however, emphasised their 
more immediate obligation to support family members and younger siblings and were 






 Like those from Cape Town, the expectations of mobility in Newcastle were greatly 
influenced by previous mobility experience. While those who were economically 
successful—those in categories 2 and 4—were incredibly optimistic about their own 
mobility and that of their children, those who were less successful—those in category 
1—were pessimistic about their and their children’s economic opportunities, again 





The views expressed by respondents in Mount Frere and Newcastle indicate that 
perceptions of economic inequality and social mobility are shaped by local 
economic conditions and by an individual’s economic position within his or her 
community. Those from Mount Frere conceptualised economic inequality in 
terms of the migratory patterns of black South Africans, the primary pathway to 
mobility for rural residents, and were much less focused on the economic 
position of other racial groups in South Africa, perhaps because the populations 
of rural areas in South Africa are almost entirely black African. Though 
previous mobility experience influenced conceptions of inequality in both Cape 
Town and Newcastle, those from Newcastle, where there are much larger black 
middle and upper classes than in Cape Town, had a much more accurate 
understanding of the continued association of race and class in South Africa. 
 
Perceptions of the pathways to upward mobility were also influenced by local 
economic conditions. Those from both Mount Frere and Newcastle, unlike those 
from Cape Town, identified politics and government employment as among the 
only available local mobility pathways, reflecting the disproportionate role of 
the public sector in the labour market of both areas. Although alcohol and drug 
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abuse do not appear to be more widespread in Mount Frere and Newcastle than 
in Cape Town, the respondents from Mount Frere and Newcastle, unlike those 
from Cape Town, repeatedly emphasised the pitfalls of illegal-drug and alcohol 
abuse. Despite the differences among the three areas, however, nearly all black 
South Africans interviewed, regardless of their mobility backgrounds, stressed 
the importance of education for upward mobility. 
 
The interviews from Cape Town, Mount Frere, and Newcastle point to an 
additional, and particularly troubling, similarity among all three areas: the 
possibility that a mobility trap—or a perpetuation of the cycle of immobility 
because parents, pessimistic about the available economic opportunities, do not 
adequately invest in their children’s futures—identified in Telzak (2012) 
extends beyond Cape Town. If a widespread mobility trap does in fact exist in 
South Africa, a large portion of the South African population may feel alienated 
by the existing economic system and is at risk of being left out of any future 
economic gains. Furthermore, the persistence of a mobility trap could exacerbate 
the already intense fragmentation of South African society along economic 



































3. How do you support yourself? 
4. In order to gauge material goods that people have:  
a. Do you have a TV? (If so, what kind: widescreen vs. older model) 
b. Do you have a cell phone? (If so, is it a smartphone?) 
c. How do you listen to music? 
d. Do you have a car? (If so, what kind?) 
5. Number of dependents (Try to parse out whether he/she is supporting 
people in other parts of country): 
a. Do you send money to family members who do not live nearby?  
b. Who are these family members? How much money do you send 
them per month? 




1. These four pictures show different types of society. The first picture 
represents a society with a small elite of rich people at the top, a few 
people in the middle, and a large number of poor people at the bottom. 
The second picture represents a society that is like a pyramid, with a small 
elite at the top, more people in the middle, and a lot of poor people at the 
bottom. The third picture shows a society in which most people are in the 
middle. The fourth picture shows a society with lots of people at the top, 
some in the middle, and very few at the bottom.  
a. Which of these pictures, in your view, describes South Africa 
today? 
b. Where would you situate yourself in that picture? 
c. Is this the same way society looked 10 years ago? What about 20 
years ago? 
d. In your understanding of the economic makeup of society, where 
would you place most of the white people?  Where would you place 
most of the black individuals? If you remove all the black people, 
what picture would you say best describes white society?  What 
about black society? 
e. How do you think society should look?  Where would you like to 
be in this hypothetical society? 
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f. What are the chances that you’ll reach the top? What about your 
children? What are the chances you’ll be in the bottom? What about 
the middle? 
 
2. Personal financial situation 
a. Is your overall financial situation today better, the same or worse 
than it was five years ago?  
b. Why has it gotten better, stayed the same, or gotten worse over the 
last five years? 
 
3. Differences between rich and poor 
a. How large do you think the differences between rich and poor are? 
b. Have these differences gotten bigger or smaller in the last 5/10/15 
years? 
 
4. Future predictions 
a. Do you think that the number of poor people in South Africa in five 
years’ time is going to be larger, the same or smaller than it is now?   
b. What about the number of rich people?  
c.  The number of middle class? 
 
5. Material possessions 
a. What material possessions do you think defines someone as rich in 
South Africa?   
b. What about poor?   
c. What about middle class? 
 
6. Government intervention 
a. Do you think that the government is doing too much, enough, or 
too little for poor people in South Africa?   
b. Do you think they’re doing too much, enough, or too little for rich 
people in South Africa?  
c. What do you think the government should do differently for the 
poor?  
d. What do you think the government should do differently for the 
rich? 
 
7. Economic status of South Africa’s black Africans 
a. Do you feel that the number of black middle class and rich people 
has increased, decreased, or remained the same in the last 10 years?   
b. How do black people become middle class or rich? 
c. Why are some people rich and others poor?   




8. Hypothetical questions 
a. What kind of car would you like to buy if money were no limit?  
i. Why do you want that car?  
ii. How will people respond if you drive around with that car? 
b. If I give you R5000 tomorrow what would you spend it on? If you 
had to give it away, to whom would you give it? 
 
9. Additional questions 
a. What would your family think if you came home with a white 
girlfriend or boyfriend?  Is this different from how other people in 
your neighbourhood would react? 
b. When you were younger, what did you want to be when you grew 
up and why?  Why have you (not) achieved these ambitions?  What 
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